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Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of the default of some personal credit 
modality in the future default of the other modalities. Using Brazilian microdata, we run 
a logistic regression to estimate the probability of default in a given credit modality, 
including among the explanatory variables the personal overdue exposure in the other 
credit modalities. Our results show that such effect is positive and significant, although 
quantitatively heterogeneous. We also discuss the rationale behind these results. 
Specifically, it was found that financing credit modalities (vehicle and real estate 
financing) contaminate more the other credit modalities, as their default may bring to 
the debtor the loss of the financed good. Moreover, riskier loan categories (overdraft, 
non-payroll-deducted personal credit and credit card) are more contaminated by the 
default of other modalities, what is explained by the fact that defaulted individuals have 
a limited access to less risky credit modalities.  
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1 Introduction 
 There is an ongoing discussion on how different loans to the same debtor should 
be categorized for the purposes of regulatory requirements, credit risk management, and 
accounting reports. According to the so-called “debtor approach”, if the debtor has a 
single material exposure categorized as non-performing, defaulted or impaired, all the 
other transactions of the same debtor should be assigned to the same category. If the 
“transaction approach” is taken instead, any single exposure is categorized regardless 
the status of the other loans to the debtor. 
 Financial regulators outline criterions for applying one approach or another. 
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the categorization 
of credit exposures as performing or non-performing should be based on the 
“transaction approach” for retail portfolios and “debtor approach” for non-retail 
portfolios (BCBS 2016). Other institutions define more quantitative thresholds. For 
instance, the European Banking Authority (EBA) establishes the following: “When a 
debtor has exposures past due more than 90 days representing 20% of all its exposures, 
or when the past-due amounts for this debtor represent 5% of its total exposures, all on- 
and off-balance sheet exposures to this debtor shall be considered as non-performing” 
(EBA 2013: 13).  
 Each approach implicitly makes different assumptions regarding the risk 
contagion among credit modalities. While the debtor approach assumes that the default 
in a single exposure will make the other debtor loans eventually become non-
performing, the individual transaction approach hypothesizes that such contagion is 
weak or inexistent. Notwithstanding, as far as we know, there is not some empirical 
study supporting any of these approaches.  
 The purpose of this paper is helping to fill this gap. Relying on two Brazilian 
datasets (the Central Bank of Brazil’s Credit Risk Bureau System and the Annual Social 
Information Survey, as we will clarify later), we assess the impact of the default of 
some credit modality in the future default of the other modalities. We study six personal 
loan modalities, chosen by their relevance in the Brazilian credit market: payroll-
deducted personal loan, non-payroll-deducted personal credit, overdraft, credit card, 
vehicles financing and real estate financing.  
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 This study is also related to the literature on credit risk modeling. A wide range 
of models have been developed aiming the estimation of probability of default in credit 
transactions. Logistic regression has been the technique traditionally employed to this 
task (Thomas et al 2002), but survival analysis models have been gaining space more 
recently (e.g., Bellotti and Crook 2009, 2014; Tong et al 2012). They have been applied 
to specific different credit modalities, as credit card loans (Leow and Crook 2016) and 
personal loans (Stepanova and Thomas 2002). For the Brazilian case, Correa et al 
(2014) used microdata to study the credit default in consumer credit and vehicles 
financing, with particular emphasis on the influence of the business cycles. Among the 
explanatory variables used in these studies, there are borrower-related variables as age, 
gender and income; transaction-related variables (e.g., operation rating); and 
macroeconomic indicators, as inflation and unemployment rate. Notwithstanding, the 
impact of the default of other credit modalities has never been analyzed yet, as we are 
going to do in this study.  
 Beside this introduction, this paper has more four sections. The next section 
draws an overall panorama of the Brazilian credit market. Section 3 describes the 
methodology and the dataset. The fourth section presents the results. Concluding 
remarks take the last section.  
 
2 The Brazilian credit market 
 The Brazilian total credit stock reached R$ 3.2 billion in December 2015, an 
amount 6.7% higher than that of December 2014. It corresponded to 54.5% of the 
Brazilian GDP, against 53.1% in December 2014. Almost half of this amount came 
from earmarked resources – i.e., those ruled by the government earmarking allocation 
regulation. Non-financial corporations had a slightly higher share in the total credit. The 
main credit modalities granted to non-financial corporations are BNDES
1
 funds 
(earmarked resources) and working capital (non-earmarked resources). Personal loans 
are granted mainly as real estate financing, personal credit – most of which is payroll-
deducted – and credit card. More than half of Brazilian credit came from state-owned 
financial institutions.  
                                                 
1
 National Bank of Social and Economic Development, the main Brazilian development bank.  
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 There was a general worsening in the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL)
2
 
between December 2014 and December 2015, reflecting the downturn of the Brazilian 
economy during this period. The total NPL ratio jumped from 2.7% to 3.4%. Although 
still smaller, the NPL ratio of earmarked resources granted to non-financial corporations 
suffered the higher proportional increase. Among the main modalities, the only one in 
which a decrease of the NPL ratio was observed was the payroll-deducted personal 
credit. NPL is more severe in the private national segment. NPL growth was more 
modest among the foreign private financial institutions and greater in the state-owned 
financial institutions, despite the latter presents the smaller NPL ratio.  
 
Table 1: Brazilian financial system credit – stock by modality (in R$ million) 
 December 2014 December 2015 
Non-financial corporations 1,605.4 1,707.2 
Non-earmarked 793.4 832.0 
Working capital 392.4 378.7 
Earmarked 812.0 875.3 
BNDES funds 595.2 633.4 
Households
1
 1,412.1 1,512.2 
Non-earmarked 782.8 805.3 
Personal credit 353.1 380.0 
Payroll-deducted 252.2 273.9 
Vehicles financing 184.1 161.1 
Credit card 160.8 172.7 
Earmarked 629.3 706.9 
Real estate financing 431.6 499.6 
Total 3,017.5 3,219.4 
% GDP 53.1 54.5 
Total earmarked 1,441.3 1,582.2 
Total non-earmarked 1,576.2 1,637.3 
By capital control   
State-owned financial institutions 1,623.1  1,796.7 
National private financial institutions 953.2  948.0 
Foreign financial institutions 441.2  474.7 
Source: CBB (2015).  
(1): Household loan is the expression used in CBB (2015) for personal loan, term we opted to adopt 
throughout this paper.  
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 For the purpose of this study, loans past due more than 90 days are considered as non-performing loans 
(NPL).  
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Table 2: Brazilian financial system credit – NPL (in %) 
 December 2014 December 2015 
Non-financial corporations 1.9 2.6 
Non-earmarked 3.4 4.5 
Working capital 3.9 4.6 
Earmarked 0.5 0.9 
BNDES funds 0.4 0.8 
Households
1
 3.7 4.2 
Non-earmarked 5.3 6.2 
Personal credit 3.8 4.3 
Payroll-deducted 2.4 2.3 
Vehicles financing 3.9 4.2 
Credit card 6.6 8.1 
Earmarked 1.6 2.0 
Real estate financing 1.4 1.8 
Total 2.7 3.4 
Total earmarked 1.0 1.4 
Total non-earmarked 4.3 5.3 
By capital control   
State-owned financial institutions 2.0 2.7 
National private financial institutions 3.7 4.6 
Foreign financial institutions 3.3 3.5 
Source: CBB (2015).  
(1): Household loan is the expression used in CBB (2015) for personal loan, term we opted to adopt 
throughout this paper.  
 
3 Methodology and dataset 
 We examine two data sets in this study: the Central Bank of Brazil’s Credit Risk 
Bureau System (SCR) and the Annual Social Information Survey (RAIS). SCR is a very 
thorough data set which records every single credit operation within the Brazilian 
financial system worth R$ 200 or above
3
. It brings, on each operation, data as financial 
institution and debtor identification, amount, type of loan, interest rate and risk 
classification. RAIS is managed by the Brazilian Ministry of Labor and contains 
information about the formal sector employees, as well as about their employers. 
Workers information includes earnings, gender, age and educational level.  
 As a first step, we generated a uniform random sample of individuals over 18 
years-old from the SCR data set. This sample contains 299,369 borrowers, about 0.5% 
SCR’s total. Then we collect information on these individuals from SCR and RAIS, as 
will be specified later.  
                                                 
3
 As we will specify later, we assessed data from December 2012, December 2013 and December 2014, 
when such lower bound was R$ 1,000. 
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 After that we run the following logistic regression: 
mtiMtitimti CXy ,,,,,,,     (1). 
 The dependent variable mtiy ,,  assumes the value 1 if the debtor had an exposure 
past due more than 90 days in the credit modality m in at least one month between t+1 
and t+Δ. We consider just overdue exposures greater than a materiality threshold of R$ 
100. The time horizon commonly used to assess credit default is 12 months (Jarrow and 
Turnbull 2000), then we used this value of Δ4. Time is discrete and measured in months. 
tiX ,  and mtiC ,,  are vectors of individual- and time-dependent variables, but the latter is 
also related to the set of credit modalities M, which includes all modalities except m; β 
and γ are vectors of parameters, while mti ,,  is the usual error term. Regarding the 
explanatory variables, as well as the dependent one, it was considered just loans from 
banks. The description of the variables is in Table 3.  
At t, we consider just the individuals which have no overdue exposure in the 
credit modality m and that appear in at least one month in the following 12 months. The 
fraction of debtors that does not appear in the subsequent months is never above 4%, as 
can be seen in Table 4. We assessed three reference dates: December 2012, December 
2013 and December 2014.  
In Table 5, we present some sample statistics. Nearly half of the individuals in 
our sample are men and most of them earn less than three minimum wages and live in 
the Southeast Region. The most widespread loan modality is the payroll-deducted 
personal loan (almost 40% of debtors with exposures in this modality), while 10% were 
granted real estate financing. More than 6% of debtors in the sample have overdue 
exposure in the credit card loan; regarding the real estate financing, this ratio is 0.2%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 We performed tests using other values of Δ, obtaining very similar results.  
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Table 3: Variables 
Variable Description Abbreviation 
Gender Dummy variable equal to 1 if male gen 
Age Age in years age 
Occupational variables
1
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
individual belongs to this 
occupational category 
 
Private sector
2
 pri 
Public sector
3
 pub 
Informal sector inf 
Firm-owner
4
 cap 
Retired ret 
Income
5
   
3-5 minimum wages (mw) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
individual has a monthly income 
between this range 
ig1 
5-10 minimum wages (mw) ig2 
Above 10 minimum wages (mw) ig3 
Geographic region
6
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
individual lives in this Brazilian 
geographic region 
 
South sth 
North nth 
Northeast nst 
Midwest mst 
Employment 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
individual is employed 
emp 
Data base
7
   
December 2013 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
information reports to this data base 
db13 
December 2014 db14 
Credit modalities 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
individual has exposure in this 
modality 
 
Payroll-deducted personal loan pay 
Non-payroll-deducted personal credit npr 
Vehicles financing veh 
Real estate financing rsf 
Credit card
8
 cre 
Overdraft ovr 
Credit modalities – ratio 
Exposure in the modality to total 
exposure ratio 
 
Payroll-deducted personal loan pay_c 
Non-payroll-deducted personal credit npr_c 
Vehicles financing veh_c 
Real estate financing rsf_c 
Credit card
8
 cre_c 
Overdraft ovr_c 
Default 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
individual has exposure past due 
more than 90 days in this credit 
modality 
 
Payroll-deducted personal loan pay_d 
Non-payroll-deducted personal credit npr_d 
Vehicles financing veh_d 
Real estate financing rsf_d 
Credit card cre_d 
Overdraft ovr_d 
(1): Control group: unemployed/other occupational categories. 
(2): Exclude financial sector employers. 
(3): Include militaries. 
(4): Include landlords. 
(5): Control group: below 3 m.w. 
(6): Control group: Southeast Region. 
(7): Control group: December 2012. 
(8): Exclude interest free transactions, associated with an instalment plan or not.  
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Table 4: Debtors that does not appear in the following 12 months, in % 
Debtors with exposures in December 2012 December 2013 December 2014 
Payroll-deducted personal loan 0.85 0.84 0.93 
Non-payroll-deducted personal credit 3.01 3.03 2.60 
Vehicles financing 1.71 1.99 2.40 
Real estate financing 0.66 0.64 0.41 
Credit card 3.94 3.41 3.39 
Overdraft 3.29 3.02 3.04 
 
Table 5: Sample statistics 
Variable December 2012 December 2013 December 2014 
Sample size 204,662  216,531  222,654  
Men – % individuals 52.8 52.2 51.8 
Age – average 46.0 46.2 46.5 
Employed – % individuals 40.3 40.1 39.5 
Income – % individuals    
Below 3 minimum wages 58.1 60.8 63.1 
3-5 minimum wages (mw) 15.5 14.9 14.6 
5-10 minimum wages (mw) 12.2 12.3 12.1 
Above 10 minimum wages (mw) 8.0 8.2 7.7 
Occupation – % individuals    
Private sector 8.3 8.0 7.8 
Public sector 7.9 7.5 7.3 
Informal sector 4.4 4.3 4.2 
Firm-owner 6.8 6.6 6.5 
Retired 4.1 3.8 3.6 
Geographic region – % individuals    
South 16.1 15.9 15.9 
Northeast 22.7 23.2 23.2 
North 5.9 6.0 6.0 
Midwest 8.2 8.2 8.2 
Southeast 47.2 46.7 46.6 
Credit modality – % individuals1    
Payroll-deducted personal loan 39.0 (1.5) 39.3 (1.6) 39.1 (1.4) 
Non-payroll-deducted personal credit 27.6 (4.0) 26.1 (3.2) 25.2 (3.1) 
Vehicles financing 19.9 (1.4) 19.2 (1.2) 17.6 (0.9) 
Real estate financing 8.0 (0.1) 9.0 (0.1) 10.0 (0.2) 
Credit card 33.9 (6.5) 34.3 (6.0) 36.4 (6.3) 
Overdraft 27.9 (3.0) 27.8 (2.5) 27.0 (2.2) 
Credit modality – average ratio    
Payroll-deducted personal loan 31.2 31.6 31.7 
Non-payroll-deducted personal credit 13.4 12.5 11.8 
Vehicles financing 15.3 14.3 12.8 
Real estate financing 6.8 7.7 8.8 
Credit card 14.4 14.8 16.3 
Overdraft 5.6 5.5 5.3 
(1): In parenthesis: % of debtors with NPE in the modality. 
 
 Table 6 brings the fraction of debtors without overdue exposures in a given 
credit modality in t that default on this loan modality between t+1 and t+12, according 
to their exposures in the other modalities. It can be seen, for instance, that 10.5% of 
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debtors with overdue exposures in real estate financing and without overdue exposures 
in credit card loan default on this latter modality within the next 12 months. In general, 
debtors with overdue exposures in a given credit modality proved to be more prone to 
default on the other loan modalities. Moreover, given that the debtor defaulted on a 
given loan modality within this time window, it happens faster (i.e., with a smaller 
average time of first default) if she has overdue exposure in other credit modality (Table 
7). 
 
Table 6: Default migration 
Credit modality  PAY NPR VEH RSF CRE OVR 
PAY 
(1) - 3.91 1.05 0.43 6.21 4.98 
(2) - 2.29 0.75 0.28 5.58 2.02 
NPR 
(1) 2.23 - 2.11 0.77 9.92 11.84 
(2) 2.22 - 1.37 0.48 12.43 7.22 
VEH 
(1) 1.75 2.74 - 0.86 7.04 3.87 
(2) 0.76 2.57 - 0.41 6.41 2.96 
RSF 
(1) 1.95 4.77 2.89 - 10.5 8.21 
(2) 0.79 2.46 0.98 - 6.53 3.94 
CRE 
(1) 2.38 5.82 2.38 1 - 7.54 
(2) 1.62 5.22 1.35 0.51 - 5.19 
OVR 
(1) 1.77 5.25 2.07 1.33 11.47 - 
(2) 2.07 7.89 1.46 0.76 11.92 - 
x(i,j) = fraction of debtors with exposure in the row modality and without overdue exposure in the column 
modality in t that default on the column modality between t+1 and t+12 (t = December 2012, December 
2013 and December 2014). 
(1): with overdue exposures in the row modality. 
(2): without overdue exposures in the row modality. 
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Table 7: Average time of first default (in months) 
Credit modality  PAY NPR VEH RSF CRE OVR 
PAY 
(1) - 4.63 5.49 5.63 5.52 4.33 
(2) - 6.46 6.01 6.2 6.34 6.85 
NPR 
(1) 5.4 - 4.97 5.3 4.22 3.62 
(2) 6.38 - 6.33 6.54 6.08 6.49 
VEH 
(1) 6.59 5.53 - 5.68 5.05 5.28 
(2) 6.37 6.47 - 6.26 6.43 6.7 
RSF 
(1) 6.06 6 5.48 - 6.31 5.49 
(2) 6.14 6.3 6.21 - 6.21 6.68 
CRE 
(1) 5.49 4.34 5.31 5.55 - 4.53 
(2) 6.39 6.02 6.3 6.44 - 6.41 
OVR 
(1) 5.28 3.17 4.99 5.61 4.08 - 
(2) 6.32 5.91 6.24 6.33 6.05 - 
x(i,j) = average time of first default, in months, of debtors with exposure in the row modality and without 
overdue exposure in the column modality in t, given that this debtor defaulted on the column modality 
between t+1 and t+12 (t = December 2012, December 2013 and December 2014). 
(1): with overdue exposures in the row modality. 
(2): without overdue exposures in the row modality. 
 
4 Results 
4.1 General results 
 Here we present the results of the logistic regression specified in equation (1) 
(Table 8). Some of the results correspond to what is intuitively expected. Employed 
individuals (especially those in the private and public sector) and individuals in higher 
income cohorts present a smaller propensity to default. We also corroborate some 
findings of other studies. For instance, as in Correa et al (2014), we find that women 
and older borrowers have a lower probability of default. 
 The influence of having exposure in other modalities on future default is mixed. 
In most of the cases, this impact is positive, but holding a high relative exposure in 
other modalities decreases the chance of default in a given modality. It can be explained 
by the fact that the existence of other modalities implies that the debtor has less 
resources to meet the debt commitments of the modality in question. However, if the 
relative weight of the other modalities is higher, it means that the relative exposure in 
the modality in question is smaller so its default will be inexistent or negligible. The 
most notable exception to this general rule is the overdraft. A greater relative exposure 
in overdraft raises the probability of default in the other modalities (except credit card 
loan), probably due to its high interest rate.  
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Table 8: Result of regression 
Independent 
variables 
Dependent variable 
PAY NPR VEH RSF CRE OVR 
Constant -1.63(***) -0.83(***) -1.55(***) -2.37(***) -0.58(***) -0.84(***) 
gen 0.33(***) 0.33(***) 0.11(***) 0.20(***) 0.18(***) 0.31(***) 
age -0.02(***) -0.03(***) -0.01(***) -0.02(***) -0.02(***) -0.02(***) 
pri -0.17(***) -0.28(***) -0.54(***) -0.19(***) -0.34(***) -0.25(***) 
pub -0.07(**) -0.45(***) -0.73(***) -0.67(***) -0.53(***) -0.57(***) 
inf 0.16(**) 0.26(***) 0.23(***) 0.33(***) 0.13(***) 0.23(***) 
cap 0.02 0.24(***) 0.18(***) 0.42(***) 0.06(**) 0.13(***) 
ret 0.20(***) 0.00 -0.18(**) -0.19 -0.08(**) -0.09 
ig1 -0.18(***) -0.29(***) -0.34(***) -0.10(**) -0.16(***) -0.24(***) 
ig2 -0.30(***) -0.41(***) -0.48(***) -0.25(***) -0.29(***) -0.39(***) 
ig3 -0.31(***) -0.46(***) -0.72(***) -0.49(***) -0.58(***) -0.54(***) 
sth -0.19(***) 0.03 -0.17(***) -0.22(***) -0.02 -0.11(***) 
nth -0.10(***) 0.01 0.14(***) 0.38(***) 0.13(***) -0.01 
nst 0.09(**) 0.07(**) 0.29(***) 0.97(***) 0.22(***) 0.03 
mst 0.03 0.09(***) 0.15(***) 0.43(***) 0.10(***) -0.01 
emp -0.32(***) -0.42(***) -0.45(***) -0.38(***) -0.31(***) -0.45(***) 
db13 -0.07(***) 0.04(*) -0.09(***) 0.00 0.06(***) 0.07(***) 
db14 -0.09(***) 0.09(***) -0.17(***) -0.11(**) 0.22(***) 0.10(***) 
pay  - 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.20(***) 0.04 
npr 0.26(***)  - 0.25(***) 0.27(***) 0.65(***) 0.50(***) 
veh -0.05 0.11(**)  - -0.16(*) 0.23(***) 0.15(***) 
rsf -0.12 0.28(***) -0.08  - 0.10 0.24(**) 
cre 0.19(***) 0.51(***) 0.11(***) 0.30(***)  - 0.53(***) 
ovr -0.05(*) 0.23(***) -0.05 -0.18(***) 0.38(***)  - 
pay_c  - -0.84(***) 0.40(***) 0.84(***) -0.47(***) -1.43(***) 
npr_c -0.57(***)  - -0.08 -0.16 -0.59(***) -0.77(***) 
veh_c -0.90(***) -0.83(***)  - -0.65(*) -0.93(***) -1.22(***) 
rsf_c -0.60(***) -0.91(***) -0.42(*)  - -0.66(***) -1.32(***) 
cre_c -0.25(*) -0.05 -0.10 0.78  - -0.43(***) 
ovr_c 1.13(***) 1.01(***) 0.89(***) 2.89(***) -0.33(***)  - 
pay_d  - 1.11(***) 0.49(***) 0.28 0.56(***) 1.47(***) 
npr_d 0.61(***)  - 0.62(***) 0.13 0.66(***) 1.19(***) 
veh_d 0.87(***) 0.79(***)  - 1.39(***) 1.01(***) 0.95(***) 
rsf_d 0.66(**) 1.04(***) 1.53(***)  - 0.76(***) 1.32(***) 
cre_d 0.59(***) 0.79(***) 1.02(***) 0.96(***)  - 0.80(***) 
ovr_d 0.20(***) 1.12(***) 0.22(**) 0.90(***) 0.63(***)  - 
(*): Significant at the 10% level. 
(**): Significant at the 5% level. 
(***): Significant at the 1% level. 
 
4.2 Risk contagion 
 As expected, there is a risk contagion among different credit modalities. In most 
of situations, the probability of a debtor having overdue exposure in a loan modality is 
positively impacted by her current overdue exposures in other credit categories. In order 
to assess such impact properly, we estimated the marginal effects following the two 
approaches discussed in the literature: the average effect over all individual 
observations, the average marginal effects (hereafter abbreviated as AME), and the 
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effect at mean values of independent variables, the marginal effects at the mean (MEM) 
(Long 1997). These results are presented in Tables 9 and 10, respectively. For the sake 
of summarization, we provide in Table 11 the in- and out-degree of contagion, which 
are, respectively, column and row mean value of the marginal effect for each modality.  
The dimension of such influence varies according to the loan modalities 
involved. The modalities whose default has the stronger impact in other modalities 
overdue exposure are the financing loans: vehicle financing and real estate financing. 
These categories have an out-degree of contagion around 12%. In these loan categories, 
the good that was purchased is the collateral of the credit operation so the financial 
institution may take it back in case of default. To avoid this situation, the debtor will 
borrow through other loan modalities in order to pay the overdue debt in the financing 
credit.  
 
Table 9: Marginal effects, AME 
 PAY NPR VEH RSF CRE OVR 
PAY - 0.1602 0.0417 0.0159 0.0967 0.2059 
NPR 0.0356 - 0.0592 0.0056 0.1163 0.1586 
VEH 0.0635 0.1186 - 0.1183 0.1897 0.1213 
RSF 0.0198 0.1248 0.1855 - 0.1113 0.1635 
CRE 0.0347 0.1094 0.1081 0.0675 - 0.0944 
OVR 0.0114 0.1638 0.0179 0.0649 0.1104 - 
 
Table 10: Marginal effects, MEM 
 PAY NPR VEH RSF CRE OVR 
PAY - 0.161 0.0383 0.0139 0.0986 0.2068 
NPR 0.0332 - 0.0548 0.0049 0.1187 0.1533 
VEH 0.0596 0.1169 - 0.1099 0.197 0.116 
RSF 0.0183 0.1235 0.1804 - 0.1139 0.1607 
CRE 0.0324 0.1065 0.1019 0.0614 - 0.0876 
OVR 0.0105 0.1646 0.0162 0.0587 0.1126 - 
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Table 11: In-degree and out-degree of contagion 
Loan modality 
In-degree
1
 Out-degree
2
 
AME MEM AME MEM 
PAY 0.0330 0.0308 0.1041 0.1037 
NPR 0.1354 0.1345 0.0751 0.0730 
VEH 0.0825 0.0783 0.1223 0.1199 
RSF 0.0544 0.0498 0.1210 0.1194 
CRE 0.1249 0.1282 0.0828 0.0780 
OVR 0.1487 0.1449 0.0737 0.0725 
(1): Average value of the marginal effects of other modalities default in the default of the modality. It 
measures how much the modality is “contaminated” by the others. Obs.: greatest values are in bold. 
(2): Average value of the marginal effects of default of the modality in the default of the other modalities. 
It measures how much the modality “contaminate” the others. Obs.: greatest values are in bold.  
 
 The modalities with the higher in-degree of contagion are the overdraft, non-
payroll-deducted personal credit and the credit card loan. Debtors with past due 
exposures have a narrower access to the credit market, being granted only risky, high 
interest rate loan modalities. In fact, the above mentioned credit categories are among 
the most expensive in Brazil (Table 12). In contrast, the payroll-deducted personal 
credit, whose interest rate is significantly smaller, is much less contaminated by other 
credit modalities. 
 
Table 12: Interest rates in Brazil, in % per year 
 December 2014 December 2015 
Overdraft 201.0 287.0 
Non-payroll-deducted 101.9 117.7 
Payroll-deducted 25.9 28.8 
Vehicles 22.3 26.0 
Credit card   
Revolving
1
 331.6 431.4 
Financing
2
 104.1 136.2 
Real estate financing 8.9 10 
(1): Include cash withdrawals. 
(2): Regular instalments only.  
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
 In this paper, using a unique Brazilian data set, we assessed the risk contagion 
among different personal loan modalities. It was observed that such default is relevant, 
that is, default in a given credit modality depends positively on the existence of past 
overdue exposures in the other credit modalities. 
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 Moreover, our results showed that the dimension of these effects varies 
according to the modalities involved – i.e., which credit modality is contaminating and 
which one is being contaminated – and we discussed the rationale behind these findings. 
Specifically, modalities whose default is very disadvantageous to the debtor, as it may 
imply the loss of a financed good (vehicle and real estate financing), contaminate more 
the other modalities. On the other hand, debtors with overdue exposures will be granted 
credit mainly from high risk credit modalities (non-payroll-deducted personal credit and 
overdraft). It explains why these credit modalities are the most contaminated ones.  
 Our study contributes to the ongoing debate involving the “debtor approach” and 
the “transaction approach”, in the sense that it provides elements to be taken into 
consideration when deciding which methodology should be adopted. Our results suggest 
that when the debtor has a relevant past due exposure in modalities with a high out-
degree of contagion (vehicle and real estate financing), her exposures in highly 
contaminated modalities (non-payroll-deducted personal credit and overdraft) should be 
a concern to financial institutions.  
 Certainly there is much more to be done in order to create a reasonable criterion 
to classify an exposure as non-performing or not, but we have shed some light on this 
issue. Specifically, we have found that the interaction between the marginal effects of 
modalities (as reported in Tables 9 and 10) and the past due exposures in these 
modalities over debtor’s total past due exposures is something to be held into account.  
 Finally, we added on new insights to the literature about credit risk. Overdue 
exposures in other credit modalities were proved, by our findings, to be important 
explanatory variables to be included in models aiming to forecast default in credit 
operations.  
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